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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FUL TON ~~U~N=T=Y~--:--:::::-:::=-_
STATE OF GEORGIA
FILED IN OFFICE
VlKEN SECURITIES LIMITED, a foreign
corporation, FELIPE SECURITIES LIMITED, a
foreign corporation, VEENA MIRCHANDANI, and
SONIY A MIRCHANDANI,
Plaintiffs,
v.

NAVIN DADLANI,
Defendant.

)
)

MAY 1 3 2015

)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

DEPUTY CLERi, SUPERIOR COURT
FULTON COUNTY, GA

Civil Action No. 2014cv250215

Opy

Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiffs'
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Counts I & II
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Navin Dadlani's Motion for Summary
Judgment and Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Count 1 and II of
Plaintiffs August 15, 2014 Renewed Complaint. Upon consideration of the briefs and materials
submitted on the Motion, oral argument of counsel and the record of the case, this Court finds as
follows:
Starting in approximately 2005, Plaintiffs invested millions of dollars in an investment
fund called Vision Opportunity Fund (the "Vision Fund") through an offshore investment vehicle
called Tiberius BVI, a company incorporated in the British Virgin Islands. Tiberius BVI was
founded by Navin Dadlani and he was originally the sole shareholder until November of2005
when he transferred all his shares to his grandmother. The shares are now held by Peach Trust,
whose ultimate beneficiaries are Mr. Dadlani's father and one other entity. The Vision Fund was
owned and operated by two friends and colleagues of Mr. Dadlani, Randolph Cohen and Adam
Benowitz. Mr. Dadlani was not and is not an officer or director of Tiberius BVI or Vision Fund.

There is no evidence Mr. Dadlani had authority to act on behalf of Tiberius BVI or Vision Fund,
specifically in 2009 and 2010. The evidence shows Plaintiffs were represented in the Tiberius
investment negotiations by Suren Mirchandani, who is not a party to this suit.

I

Suren was also

authorized by his father BK to act on behalf of Felipe and Viken in matters related to investment
deals with Mr. Dadlani and the subsequent law suits. BK and Veena are not officers, directors,
employees or trustees of Vi ken or Felipe.
Plaintiffs entered into investment agreements with Tiberius allowing Tiberius to manage
Plaintiffs' investments and enter transactions on the investors' behalf and they were aware their
money would be invested by Tiberius in the Vision Fund. Mr. Dadlani was not paid for
investment advice by either Tiberius BVI or Plaintiffs. In March 2009, Plaintiffs received notice
the Vision Fund had stopped paying out redemption requests or had "gated." As a result,
Plaintiffs lost millions of dollars. Following the loss, Suren and the other Plaintiffs claimed
Navin Dadlani led them to believe the investments with Tiberius were "risk-free" and that
Plaintiffs could not lose money.
On October 9, 2009, Mr. Dadlani and Veena both signed a written contract (the "2009
Contract"). Veena testified she entered into this agreement "so that the family would stay
together." The 2009 Contract says:
This Agreement is made between Mrs. Veena Bhagwan Mirchandani (Mrs.
Mirchandani) and Mr. Navin Dadlani (Mr. Dadlani). Mr. Dadlani was entrusted
with USS 8 million borrowed against 81 Avenue Road property and a further
investment of approximately USS 20 million which is presently valued at USS
14.5 million.

1 PlaintiffVeena Mirchandani's husband, BK Mirchandani, and her son (Navin Dadlani's cousin), Suren
Mirchandani, are non-parties but it appears that BK was the source of much of the family's wealth and
that his son, Suren, acted as a fmancial advisor for the family members and the corporate entities in which
the family members had a stake. BK was the ultimate beneficiary of the trust that owns Plaintiffs Viken
and Felipe. For clarity, the Court will refer to the Mirchandanis by first name.

Mr. Dadlani undertakes to repay USS 8 million borrowed against 81 A venue
Road to ABN Amro Bank, Jersey latest by 31 SI December 2009 or earlier and

redeem the original Title Deeds and hand them over to Mrs. Mirchandani.
The other investment which presently stands valued at USS 14.5 million will be
repaid within twelve months from date hereof with an amount ofUSS 18 million,
yielding an annual return of25%. Any profit over and above 25% per annum will
be added to the principal amount of investment.
Mr. Dadlani is personally responsible for the repayment of both the aforesaid
investments.
Further investments i.e. Guardian Fund or any other fund recommended by Mr.
Dadlani will be considered favorably by Mrs. Mirchandani.
It is undisputed Mr. Dadlani did not make any payments though there is evidence Tiberius paid

Felipe and Viken some money after the execution of the 2009 Contract.
On March 17,2010, Veena and Mr. Dadlani entered into another contract (the "2010
Contract"). The 2010 Contract says:
Agreement Reached Between Mrs. V.B. Mirchandani and Navin Dadlani:
1.

The repayment schedule to both Viken and Felipe that was agreed between
Suren Mirchandani and Navin Dadlani will remain. The schedule will be
attached to this document.

2. Navin will ensure that Felipe is paid off as per the schedule. However, in
order to securitise the repayment of Felipe, the Peach Trust agrees and will
immediately sign a letter of irrevocable transfer to ABN Amro indicating that
the proceeds of the sale of Navin's flat at Prince Albert Road will be used to
pay down the Felipe loan.
3.

Navin will also explore and ensure that an irrevocable letter of wishes is given
to the Peach Trust by the Settlor indicating that in the event of a default by
Navin in repayment of the Felipe loan, ownership of Tiberius will move to
Viken or any other entity acceptable to Mrs. VBM. In other words, the shares
of Tiberius will be transferred to Viken. Once Felipe is fully repaid this letter
of wishes will be tom up. If this letter of wishes cannot be put in place, then
Navin will work with Ron and Paul to find another way to securitise the
Felipe investment by way of making VBM or Viken the owner of Tiberius.

4. Tiberius also owes Mrs. V B Mirchandani and Soniya Mirchandani the
approximate sum ofUSD 3.6 M that is to say USD 2M to Soniya and USD

1.6M at this time to Mrs. VBM. Tiberius guarantees that it will pay Soniya a
minimum of GBP 500,000 by the end of March 2011. Apart from this, any
funds that come from redemptions on Soniya and Mrs. VBM's account in this
year and the following years will be paid to them both.
Mr. Dadlani and Veena are signatories to the 2010 Contract and Suren signed as a witness.
There is no indication on the face of the Contract that Veena or Suren was signing on behalf of
Felipe or Viken or that Navin was signing on behalf of the Peach Trust or Tiberius. Again, there
is no evidence that any payments were ever made under the 2010 Contract. On May 26, 2010,
Paul Reed, the trustee of the Peach Trust, sent Veena a letter about the 2010 Contract informing
her that Mr. Dadlani had no authority to bind Tiberius BVI or any of its shareholders in any way.
In February of2011, Plaintiffs filed an action in the UK against Mr. Dadlani.

In October

of the same year Suren agreed, in exchange for Mr. Dadlani's cooperation, to "hold [Dadlani]
harmless against any claims that may be brought against you as a consequence of the truthful
cooperation." In November, Mr. Dadlani was interviewed by Mr. Oliver in an effort to assist
Plaintiffs in investigating the prospects of recovering as much money as possible for the family
and the UK. lawsuit was allowed to lapse. Viken also sued Tiberius in the British Virgin Islands,
but this suit was dismissed in January of2013. The current claims were filed on August 15,
2014.
Summary judgment should be granted when the movant shows "there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(c). To avoid summary judgment, "an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise
provided in this Code section, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial." § 9-11-56(e). "Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal
knowledge" and "shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in the evidence." Id. The

Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Morgan v. Barnes,

221 Ga. App. 653, 654 (1996).
I.

Breach of the 2009 Contract

Mr. Dadlani asserts the 2009 Contract is unenforceable because the agreement lacks clear
identity of parties, bargained-for consideration or signatures of the claimed parties and, therefore,
Plaintiffs Veena Mirchandani and Felipe Securities' claim for breach of the 2009 Contract fails
as a matter oflaw. "To constitute a valid contract, there must be parties able to contract, a
consideration moving to the contract, the assent of the parties to the terms of the contract, and a
subject matter upon which the contract can operate." O.C.G.A. §13-3-1.
A.

The 2009 Contract Lacks Bargained-For Consideration.

Mr. Dadlani argues that the 2009 Contract fails for lack of consideration. The only return
promise expressly made in the 2009 Contract is Veena's promise to favorably consider future
investments recommended by Mr. Dadlani. However, this is insufficient consideration because
it is an illusory promise. Kemira, Inc. v. Williams Investigative & Sec. Servs., Inc., 215 Ga. App.
194, 198 (1994) ("Words of promise which by their terms make performance entirely optional
with the 'promisor' whatever may happen, or whatever course of conduct in other respects he
may pursue, do not constitute a promise.").
Plaintiffs argue the consideration bargained for was Plaintiffs' promise to (1) forego
legal action against Mr. Dadlani and Tiberius BVI; (2) discount the amount to be repaid to
Plaintiffs for their investments; and (3) give Mr. Dadlani and/or Tiberius more time to repay.
While Plaintiffs argue Dadlani was acting as an agent of Tiberius, Veena testified she viewed the
agreement as between her and Dadlani only, and not as an agreement with Tiberius, and Tiberius
is not a party to this action.

As an initial matter, the Court is not persuaded that benefits under a promise running to
Tiberius are valid consideration in a contract purporting to bind Mr. Dadlani since Mr. Dadlani is
not an officer or director of Tiberius and Plaintiffs' investment agreements were with Tiberius
and not with Dadlani personally.'

Likewise, the Court is not persuaded by Plaintiffs' argument

that Mr. Dadlani ultimately benefitted from a forbearance to sue Tiberius because his father was
the ultimate beneficiary of the Trust that owned Tiberius and family wealth means Mr. Dadlani
is wealthy. This purported personal benefit to Mr. Dadlani is far too tenuous. Therefore, any
bargained-for benefit to Tiberius BVI (i.e., extension oftime to repay, discount on amount to
repay, forbearance from filing law suit) would not be valid consideration for a promise for Mr.
Dadlani to personally repay the debts ofTiberius.3
As to Plaintiffs' assertion they were foregoing their right to sue Mr. Dadlani personally,
the Court is unpersuaded this implied promise was sufficiently definite from the face of the
contract.

"[I]n construing a contract, courts 'must look to the four comers of the document' and

cannot consider parol evidence unless there is an ambiguity that cannot be resolved by
employing the rules of contract construction." Lee v. Choi, 754 S.E.2d 371,376

(Ga. Ct. App.

2013) (quoting DeKalb County v. City 0/ Decatur, 297 Ga.App. 322, 325 (2009)).

"Forbearance

[to bring an action], to constitute legal consideration, must be such as will tie the creditor's hands
for a definite time established between the parties."
93 Ga. App. 708,709

Ballentine Motors of Ga., Inc. v. Nimmons,

(1956); see also Trust Co. of Columbus v. Rhodes, 144 Ga App 816, 818

(affirming grant of summary judgment on bank's claims against insurer after insurer promised to

The investment agreements between Plaintiffs and Tiberius are not before the Court. Presumably any
claim that Tiberius owed money to Plaintiffs would arise under the redemption terms of these contracts,
so the extent of Tiberius's obligation to repay any amount or over what time frame is not clear from the
record.
3 At the hearing, Plaintiffs conceded the 2009 Contract did not meet the statutory requirements of a
guarantee.
2

include bank as loss payee when issuing a check to its insured but failed to do so because the
promise was given without consideration).

The Court finds the Lee v. Choi case instructive.

Lee, 754 S.E.2d at 376. The agreement at issue in Lee was one to pay Choi $450,000 for work
he had already performed for the Lees. The Court granted the Lees' summary judgment on a
breach of contract claim due to lack of consideration. Choi argued the promise to pay was a
settlement agreement that was a compromise regarding a disputed claim. The Court rejected this
argument, noting that there was no language in the four comers of the contract revealing a
disputed claim or disagreement. Id. Similarly, in this case, there is no language in the four
comers of the contract that indicates Mr. Dadlani's promise to pay was in exchange for
forbearance, for what time period, or for what claims, or that the agreement was intended to
settle a dispute. Nothing in the 2009 Contract refers to forbearance or prevents Veena from
pursuing claims. Furthermore, Veena testified that at the time she signed the 2009 Contract she
did not have any intention of taking legal action. As such, the Court finds the 2009 Contract
fails for lack of consideration.
B.

Veena was not acting as an actual or purported agent of Felipe.

Felipe is not mentioned anywhere in the 2009 Contract and there is no express indication
Veena was signing the 2009 Contract on behalf of Felipe, either directly or as an intended third
party beneficiary. No separate corporate representative signed on behalf of Felipe. Veena
testified her husband, BK, authorized her to sign on behalf of Felipe, but BK is not a director,
officer, shareholder, or trustee of Felipe and it is unclear how BK as an ultimate beneficiary is
authorized to appoint agents on the company's behalf. There is no sufficient evidence Veena had
ever been authorized to act on behalf of Felipe before the 2009 Contract.

Plaintiffs argue that even ifVeena was not an agent, actual or otherwise, Felipe
subsequently ratified the 2009 Contract by bringing the breach of contract claim. See
MacDonald v. Harris, 265 Ga App. 131, 133 (2003) (noting that a principal can ratify an

unauthorized action of an agent or purported agent by bringing legal action based on the
unauthorized act with full knowledge of the material facts). The Court is not persuaded by this
argument because as discussed above, Veena was not purporting to enter the 2009 Contract for
the benefit of Felipe, and on the face of the 2009 Contract, no benefit flowed to Felipe. The 2009
Contract notes two investments that are to be repaid, but does not clarify to whom. Therefore,
any subsequent ratification would be of no consequence to Felipe because Felipe is not promised
any benefit. As such, the claim for breach of the 2009 Contract fails.
For the reasons discussed above, the 2009 Contract is unenforceable, and Defendant's
motion for summary judgment on the claim for breach of the October 9,2009 contract is
GRANTED and Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on the count is DENIED.
II.

Breach of the 2010 Contract

Likewise, Mr. Dadlani asserts the 2010 Contract is unenforceable for many of the same
reasons and therefore the breach of the 2010 Contract claim brought by Plaintiffs Viken, Felipe,
Veena and Soniya fail as a matter oflaw.
A. The 2010 Contract Lacks Bargained-For Consideration.
Plaintiffs again argue the consideration bargained for was Plaintiffs' promise to (1)
forego legal action against Mr. Dadlani and Tiberius BY 1; (2) discount the amount to be repaid
to Plaintiffs for their investments; and (3) give Mr. Dadlani and/or Tiberius BVI more time to
repay. Again, nothing on the face of the 2010 Contract prevents any of the Plaintiffs from
bringing suit against Dadlani or Tiberius BVI. Indeed, Plaintiffs filed the action in the UK in

February of2011 even though payment from Tiberius to Soniya was not due until the end of
March. Therefore, the Court is not persuaded a promise to forego legal action was valid
consideration or even a term of the 2010 Contract.
Likewise, there is no indication an extension to repay or a discounted amount to repay
was the intended consideration for the 2010 Contract. There is no indication that Mr. Dadlani
was under any obligation to pay on behalf of Tiberius who managed the investments, leaving a
naked, voluntary promise by Mr. Dadlani to repay the debts of others, even assuming such debt
existed.
B. Veena and Mr. Dadlani were acting individually and not as purported agents.

Next, Plaintiffs argue Mr. Dadlani is personally liable for the debts for holding himself
out as the agent of Tiberius under O.C.G.A.§ 10-6-85. Although the 2010 Contract is styled
"Agreement Reached between Mrs. V.B. Mirchandani and Navin Dadlani," the 2010 Contract
promises various actions by Tiberius and Peach Trust for the benefit of Felipe, Viken, Veena and
Soniya.

However, there is no evidence Veena mistook Mr. Dadlani as Tiberius's agent or the

trustee of the Peach Trust when she entered into the agreement with Mr. Dadlani. Veena
testified that the 2010 Contract was "between Navin and me" and had "nothing to do with
Tiberius." Indeed, upon hearing about the 2010 Contract, a representative of the Peach Trust
wrote Veena in May of2010 to inform her Mr. Dadlani was not an authorized agent of Tiberi us
and was not authorized to enter into the 2010 Contract.
Finally, as discussed above, there is insufficient evidence Veena was authorized to bind
Felipe, Viken, and Soniya to the 2010 Contract. There is no evidence Veena had ever been
authorized to act on behalf of the corporate entities in the past, nor for purposes of entering into

the 2010 Contract, or that BK had the authority to authorize her to enter into contracts on behalf
of the corporate entities.
As such, Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the claim for breach of the
March 17, 2010 contract is GRANTED and Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on the

claim is DENIED.
III.

Promissory Estoppel

Plaintiffs, in the alternative to their breach of contract claims discussed above, assert they
relied on the promises and representations in the 2009 and 2010 Contracts to their detriment. "A
promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part
of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if
injustice can be avoided only by enforcement ofthe promise." O.C.G.A. § 13-3-44.
"Detrimental reliance which causes a substantial change in position will constitute sufficient
consideration to support promissory estoppel." Balmer v. Elan Corp., 261 Ga. App. 543, 545
(2003) aff'd, 278 Ga. 227(2004) (citations omitted). "Promissory estoppel does not apply to a
promise that is vague, indefinite, or of uncertain duration." Mariner Healthcare, Inc. v. Foster,
280 Ga. App. 406, 412 (2006). The statute of limitations for a promissory estoppel claim is four
years. See O.e.O.A. § 9-3-25.
Plaintiffs concede that the claim for promissory estoppel based on the repayment of $ 8
million in the 2009 Contract is time-barred because the money was due and not paid more than
four years from filing the claim. However, Plaintiffs ask the Court to consider the 2009 Contract
as an installment contract and to separately consider the part of the 2009 Contract requiring
repayment of$14.5 million which did not need to be paid for a year, or October 17, 2010, as
within the four year statute of limitation.

Plaintiffs allege that in reliance on Dadlani's representations, they delayed bringing
immediate legal action, did not make redemption requests from 2009 to 2013 and their ability to
recover decreased over this time because the value of the investments continue to decline and
several claims were now barred by the statute of limitations.

Conversely, Mr. Dadlani asserts

there is no evidence Plaintiffs changed their position in reliance to the promises made in the 2009
and 2010 Contracts or, if they did, the change in position caused them harm.

There is no

evidence that any Plaintiff relied on Mr. Dadlani's promises in the 2009 and 2010 Contracts to
their detriment. Veena testified that at the time she signed the 2009 and 2010 Contracts she had
no intention to sue so there is no evidence Veena changed her position in reliance on the 2009
and 2010 Contracts. Further, the Court is not persuaded Plaintiffs did not make redemption
requests in reliance on Mr. Dadlani's promises. First, Plaintiffs were notified Vision Fund had
"gated" and redemption requests were not being fulfilled in March of 2009. Second, Plaintiffs
were informed in July of 201 0 by Tiberius that Tiberius had made a redemption request for the
entire amount invested in the Vision Fund so a redemption request by the Plaintiffs would have
been futile. Thus, the Court agrees there is no evidence Plaintiffs changed their positions to their
detriment in reliance on Mr. Dadlani' s promises to payor that Plaintiffs' reliance caused further
harm to their investments that could otherwise have been avoided. As such, Defendant's motion
for summary judgment on the claim for promissory estoppel is GRANTED.
IV.

Breach of Fiduciary Duties

Plaintiffs allege Mr. Dadlani, as Plaintiffs' broker and financial advisor, breached his
fiduciary duties of good faith and loyalty because he knew the Vision Fund was "dead" by May
of2009, but withheld the information from Plaintiffs. "Any relationship shall be deemed
confidential, whether arising from nature, created by law, or resulting from contracts, where one

party is so situated as to exercise a controlling influence over the will, conduct, and interest of
another or where, from a similar relationship of mutual confidence, the law requires the utmost
good faith, such as the relationship between partners, principal and agent, etc." O.C.G.A. § 23-

2-58. "Although a confidential relationship may exist between businessmen in some situations,
in the majority of business dealings no confidential relationship is created merely because the
parties have trust and confidence in each other's integrity." Royal v. Bland Properties, Inc., 175
Ga. App. 250, 251 (1985) (citing Cochran v. Murrah, 235 Ga. 304,306 (1975); Lewis v.
Alderman, 117 Ga. App. 855(1) (1968)).The existence of family relationships is insufficient to
establish a confidential relationship. First Am. Bank v. Bishop, 244 Ga. 317, 319 (1979)
(evidence showing that bank officer was brother of plaintiffs daughter-in-law, solicited plaintiff
and induced him to place his business with the bank, and promised to keep his affairs
confidential and to treat plaintiff right was insufficient to create a confidential relationship).
Plaintiffs acknowledge in their Complaint that, as Tiberius BVI investors, they received
regular updates and information regarding their accounts throughout the life of their investments
regarding how the fund was performing and the value of their investments at least until
September of2010 as required under the terms of Felipe and Viken's investment management
agreements with Tiberius. Renewed CompI. ~~ 39-41. While Plaintiffs may have had great
confidence in their cousin and nephew, Mr. Dadlani, the evidence is undisputed that Plaintiffs
are sophisticated investors and relied on advisors other than Mr. Dadlani. And, ultimately, the
money was invested with Tiberius, not Mr. Dadlani personally. In the absence of evidence of a
confidential relationship, the claim for breach of fiduciary duties must fail.
Alternatively, the breach of fiduciary duty claims are time-barred. See Godwin v. Mizpah
Farms, LLLP, 330 Ga. App. 31 (2014) (applying four year statute oflimitations to breach of

fiduciary claims arising under statutory or common law); Hendry v. Wells, 286 Ga. App. 774,
779 (2007) (applying four year statute of limitations under O.C.G.A. § 9-3-31 to breach of
fiduciary duty claims).

Plaintiffs argue Mr. Dadlani breached his duty by actively concealing

information about the Vision Fund's status from Plaintiffs as late as 2011.
on a May 7,2011

First, Plaintiffs rely

letter from Mr. Dadlani to his Uncle Mathani as evidence that he was actively

concealing information about the Vision Fund's status from Plaintiffs. In this letter, Mr. Dadlani
states that "The Vision fund is dead. I do not believe that fund will make any more money, nor
do I believe it will get above high water mark." He called the fund a "worthless vehicle." He
then asked his uncle not to share the information with other family members.
rely on a letter to Randolph Cohen on May 11, 2011,

Second, Plaintiffs

one of the owners of the Vision Fund, in

which Mr. Dadlani states that he was able to "shield the fund from any harm" for two full years
since the fund gated by "holding off the family for as long as possible," but could no longer hold
them off. They argue that this letter is evidence that Mr. Dadlani's loyalty was with the fund and
not with the family members despite his fiduciary duties to them.

.

The Court is not persuaded that a confidential relationship, even if initially formed, still
existed in 2011.

The evidence is clear Plaintiffs were receiving updates through Tiberius,

including inforrnation ab.out the fund gating in March of2009.

The parties were adverse to one

another by 2009 when Tiberius could no longer honor redemption requests made by Plaintiffs
and Veena began negotiating the terms of the 2009 Contract with Mr. Dadlani, so even if a
confidential relationship was formed in 2005 between the parties through the initial investments
made by Plaintiffs in Tiberius, the relationship ended once the parties were adverse to one
another.

As such, Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the claim for breach of

fiduciary duty is GRANTED.

v.

Punitive Damages and Attorneys' Fees

"The derivative claims of attorney fees and punitive damages will not lie in the absence
of a finding of compensatory damages on an underlying claim." D. G. Jenkins Homes, Inc. v.
Wood, 261 Ga. App. 322, 325 (2003) (citing Wade v. Culpepper, 158 Ga. App. 303, 305 (1981)).
As such, Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the claims for punitive damages and
attorneys' fees is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED, this 13th day of May, 2015.

SENIOR JUDGE
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